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The Limits of Isomorphism:
Global Investment Law and the ASEAN Investment Regime

Sungjoon Cho ♠ and Jürgen Kurtz♣

Abstract

This article probes the unique ontogenetic path of ASEAN’s regulation of foreign
investment by juxtaposing global investment law and the ASEAN context. While the
former delivers a powerful heuristic on isomorphism that ASEAN exhibits in its strong
reflection of global investment norms, the latter sheds critical light on ideological and
analytical blind spots by exploring distinct heterogeneities in ASEAN’s investment
regulation. Those heterogeneities are not simply outliers but reflect important historical
and cultural values inherent to ASEAN and its members. The insights uncovered in this
article invite scholars and policymakers to define a new form of global investment law
that is more inclusive and flexible than the strict and conventional paradigm.

I. Introduction

The South East Asian region is rife with gloomy collective memories. Its colonial past
was followed by postwar geopolitical conflict and turbulence. Ideological economic
♠
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strategies, such as import substitution, have proven disappointing in their ability to
deliver sustainable levels of economic growth and development outcomes.
Nonetheless, those states interlinked around the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) shifted their economic paradigm from a closed to open economy in
the 1980s. Ever since, trade and investment flows in and out of this area have been
nothing short of spectacular. Between 1990 and 2014 the investment inflow into and
outflow from this region have increased approximately ten times and thirty four times,
respectively. 1 By 2014, FDI flows to ASEAN exceeded inflows to China making it the
largest recipient of FDI in the developing world. 2

Notably, this paradigm shift by ASEAN countries has been powered by a thick set of
global trade and investment norms. A variety of treaties provided ASEAN nations with
modern regulatory platforms necessary to integrate their economies into the global
market. At the same time, policymakers and private practitioners from developed
countries as well as international organizations, such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, offered their technical assistance to the ASEAN
nations in adopting neoliberal reform in the areas of trade and investment liberalization.
Naturally, ASEAN nations relied heavily on general legal principles and templates, such
as model bilateral investment treaties (BITs) originally created by developed states and
then dispersed mimetically.

1
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Nonetheless, isomorphism of this type does not necessarily mean “equifinality.” 3
Despite general convergence into global patterns in the basic legal structure and tenets,
both the individual ASEAN BITs (signed between ASEAN nations and non-ASEAN
nations) and the collective ASEAN investment regime (AIR) (addressing intra-ASEAN
investment flows) feature unique departures from the global investment model. There is
a temptation to dismiss these departures as mere outliers. However, this article takes
those heterogeneities seriously and explores a structural explanation by juxtaposing
“world polity theory” and “historical institutionalism.” While the former delivers a
powerful heuristic on isomorphism that ASEAN BITs and AIR demonstrate in their
manifestations toward “Global Investment Law” (GIL), the latter tends to complement
the former by shedding critical light on the ideological and analytical blind spots
exposed by those heterogeneities.

Against this background, Part II begins by defining GIL as an extensive and thick
network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), investment chapters of certain regional
trade agreements (such as NAFTA Chapter 11) and investment arbitration decisions
derived from these primary sources. GIL is a relatively congruent legal regime whose
original development has been nurtured by key developed countries, such as the United
States and the European Union members, since the 1980s. Those BITs and investment
chapters comprising GIL are substantively similar largely because of: (a) the negotiating
power of the developed country partner to a given investment treaty with smaller states
forced to act as law-takers; and (b) the tendency – until recently – to replicate those
3
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terms throughout the network. In explaining both the emergence and prevalence of GIL,
we employ “world polity” theory. According to this theory, GIL as a world investment
culture holds a homogenizing effect over the ASEAN investment regime (AIR). Part III
then contrasts this converging force of GIL with key diverging trends within AIR. Certain
tailoring of AIR is substantively and conceptually distinct to GIL, albeit not always
unproblematic. From a comparative perspective, we highlight such uniqueness of AIR
vis-à-vis GIL, including the striking asymmetry between extra-ASEAN and intra-ASEAN
investment liberalization (“reverse open regionalism”) as well as departures from a body
of GIL classically represented by Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Here, we can benefit from
“historical institutionalism” in tracing ASEAN’s unique path-dependency, such as in its
own vaunted “ASEAN Way.”4

The insights uncovered in this article hold broader implications beyond the ASEAN
region. World polity or world culture is real and its homogenizing power is undeniable.
A vast network of transnational norm entrepreneurs – both public and private – offers
recipients of such culture with concrete manuals in the form of treaties and other
regulations. In this regard, the “norm-cycle” model (norm emergence, norm cascade
and internalization) is useful in grappling with this homogenizing process and its

4
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implications. 5 Yet despite its strong gravitational pull, world culture’s converging power
should be placed into careful perspective. A number of factors, such as subject-matter,
may lead receivers of world culture to emulate the global script selectively rather than
indiscriminately. 6 In this sense, globalization may be “the twofold process involving the
universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism.” 7 We should
caution against the “inevitability assumption”8 that underlies world polity theory. One
may want to ask: “what is happening in ASEAN regarding international economic
governance?” rather than “how is ASEAN’s investment liberalization going?” 9 As Daniel
Lynch aptly observes, “rather than (…) viewing states as either already socialized or
certainly on the way to becoming socialized into the [global] constitutive norms (…), it is
significantly more satisfying to view states as choosing to embrace some norms while
rejecting others fundamentally.” 10 Indeed, the push to selectivity is given added
momentum when one considers that global norms (such as GIL), are not in complete
coherence within themselves, yielding contradictory claims and interpretations by some
states. 11

The limit of functionalism (rationalism) embedded in historical institutionalism teaches
us that inter-state haggling may not be the only pathway to reach international
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cooperation. The values inherent in historical and cultural contexts are incalculable and
therefore not prone to simple reciprocal bargaining. International negotiators should
take these contexts of their counterparts into careful account before advancing marketopening requests. Hence the importance of communication and dialogue in
international negotiations. Indeed, a certain institutional heterogeneity departing from
the world polity may subsequently become a global trend itself. Some observers have
been struck by the prescience of the ASEAN states in the manner in which they
remodeled the ASEAN investment treaty in light of the Asian financial crisis. We are
really only now seeing other states insert flexibilities for financial restrictions, such as
capital controls, belatedly, particularly in the EU, as they had been overly influenced by
the orthodox position prosecuted aggressively by the neoliberal mantra. Ironical as it
may sound, some local deviations from world culture may become internationalized. 12

II. Global Investment Law and ASEAN Investment Regime

Conceptualizing Global Investment Law

World polity theory provides a theoretical underpinning of GIL. World polity theory
interprets various aspects of international relations, such as interstate cooperation,
through global norms, value and meaning structure. It is a macro-structural theory in
that it emphasizes a broad “cultural” background that shapes states’ identities and
actions. As an institutionalist theory, this theory shares its sociological tradition with
12
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Emile Durkheim (“collective representation”) 13 and Pierre Bourdieu (“field”) 14. John
Meyer and the Stanford school developed this theory in an effort to understand the
phenomenon of postwar globalization, in particular normative and institutional
convergence and isomorphism. 15 John Meyer et al. epitomizes world polity theory as
follows:

The development and impact of global sociocultural structuration greatly
intensified with the creation of a central world organizational frame at the end of
World War II. In place of the League of Nations, which was a limited international
security organization, the United Nations system and related bodies (the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade [GATT]) established expanded agendas of concern for international
society, including economic development, individual rights, and medical, scientific,
and educational development. This framework of global organization and
legitimation greatly facilitated the creation and assembly of expansive
components of an active and influential world society. 16

At the heart of world polity theory lies the thesis of inevitability and convergence. Bjorn
Wittrock argues that “modernity is a global condition that now affects all our actions,
interpretations, and habits, across nations and irrespective of which civilizational roots
13
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we may have or lay claim to.”17 Likewise, Martha Finnemore observes that “Weberian
rationality is marching relentlessly across the earth, leaving in its wake a marketized,
bureaucratized world of increasingly similar forms.” 18 Therefore, as a symbol of
modernization, world culture is naturalized and thus normativized as if inevitable. 19 This
inevitability thesis understands economic development in terms of cultural
isomorphism, 20 in contrast to “world-systems theory” that focuses on stratification (such
as core versus periphery) from a materialist perspective. 21

The inevitability and convergence thesis underlying world polity theory tends to
determine its investigative methodologies. For example, if an unknown society is
discovered, world polity theorists would analyze its economy “with standard types of
data, organizations, and policies for domestic and international transactions.”22 In this
sense, world polity theory shares a rationalist tradition that measures regularities in
political life by a scientific (positivist) methodology. 23

Against this theoretical background, GIL can be defined as a thick set of Western
initiated BITs and investment chapters in regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA,

17
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as well as related case law. Although traceable to customary international law as
originally developed in the 19th and the early 20th centuries, most of its contemporary
corpus juris was formulated in the late 1980s following the tide of globalization.
Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, customary international law had reflected
the strategic interests of major state powers. In particular, state taking of private
property by the state was regarded as a deviant act that could only take place in
exceptional circumstances. Even when authorized, expropriation would require the
payment of full compensation to the affected property owner. These fundamental liberal
precepts come under serious challenge by the mid-20th century.

After the end of the Second World War, the decolonialization wave drastically
transformed such liberal precepts through escalating practices of expropriation and
nationalization. Newly decolonized countries pursued not only political independence
but also economic sovereignty. While continuing investment from the former colonizers
may have contributed to economic development of those newly independent countries,
such investment was politically shunned as a lingering legacy of colonialism. Instead,
these newly independent states sought to indigenize their economies by acquiring full
control of the infrastructural frameworks left by the former colonizers. In a time of fierce
political contestation, an array of ideological influences spanning from Marxism to import
substitution fueled these inward-looking investment policies. 24

24

Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd. ed. Routledge, 2005)
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It was not until the 1980s that the winds of change began to influence those developing
countries that had long adhered to inward-looking developmental strategies. The
disappointing outcome of their preferred models stood in striking contrast with the
glaring economic performance by some Asian countries that had chosen an outwardlooking (often export-driven) orientation. Once they resolved to change gears in their
developmental models, these former colonies had to send a strong signal to capitalexporting countries and their nationals that they were now ready to welcome foreign
investment with due protection. For this purpose, entry into BITs was an ideal choice
for these capital-importing states.

Not surprisingly, the primary focus of these new treaty disciplines was the contentious
practice of government takings of property owned by foreign actors. Even if a state is
acting for a public purpose (which would encompass newer goals of nationalization 25
and in a non-discriminatory fashion, compensation would now be required to be paid to
the foreign property holder at a very particular rate. 26 The post-war authorities that had
begun to tentatively affirm a loose customary standard of “appropriate” compensation
were now displaced in favour of the fuller requirement of “prompt, adequate and

25

American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran 1983-III, 19 December 1983, Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 4 C.T.R. 96 (1983-III); Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 14 July 1987, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 15 C.T.R. 189, 233 (1987-II).
26
For example, article III of the model U.S. bilateral investment treaty provides: “Neither Party shall
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payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law
and the general principles of treatment provided for in Article II(3)”.UNCTAD, International Investment
Instruments: A Compendium v. 3, (2002) p. 195.This type of provision is by no means limited to
investment treaties concluded by the U.S. It is instead a feature of most post-war investment treaty
regimes.
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effective” compensation. 27 This guarantee of compensation is also extended beyond
the paradigmatic case of direct expropriation to encompass regulatory or tax measures
that might be considered “indirect” acts of state taking. 28 Yet there is no attempt within
early BIT practice to delineate the level of disruption or impact on a foreign investor
sufficient to trigger the obligation to pay compensation for “indirect” expropriation. This
absolute guarantee is typically matched by other broad standards of protection required
of a signatory host state within early BITs. The most abstract of these is the obligation
to accord foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment” 29 with no real attempt across
early BIT practice to delineate the outer contours of this amorphous standard. At best,
certain formulations - especially in treaties concluded by the U.S. – eventually link its
coverage to treatment at international law. 30

Notably, there is no real attempt to delineate these strong treaty obligations with core
regulatory objectives. On this point, we have a striking departure with the post-Second
World War attempts to facilitate the reduction of barriers to trade in goods in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 which sought to accommodate
key public values. Domestic taxes and regulations are fully permitted under the national
treatment obligation provided that they are not protectionist devices that would distort

27

Ibid.
Ibid.
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UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium v. 1 (2004) pp. 209-233.
30
Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA for example provides: “Each Party shall accord to investments of
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Dec. 17 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S, 32 ILM 289 and 505 (1993), Art. 1105(1).
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the bargain on tariff reductions among GATT member states. 31 Yet other articles
facilitated intervention by states when required to maintain domestic stability. 32 There is
even a list of general exceptions that enable states to prioritize key public values (such
as health protection) over their commitments to liberalize trade. 33 In the classic BIT
model, there is no equivalent of the flexibility for state action inherent in GATT Article
XX to balance against the strict obligations formed during this inception period.

The unique dispute settlement processes under BITs offer an especially stark insight
into this project of carving out a strong zone of protection for foreign investors. These
provide the greatest normative departure from the pre-existing customary regime. The
customary rules on diplomatic protection of aliens controlled when a state could bring
international action for harm to its nationals, including economic actors operating abroad.
The right to exercise diplomatic protection is vested exclusively in the state of the
injured national and remains a discretionary power which the state is under no duty or
obligation to exercise. 34 Aside from the sovereign election to champion the cause of the

31

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, TIAS No 1700, 55 UNTS 194 [hereinafter
GATT], Art. III(1); Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 4 October 1996, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS8/AB/R, pp. 14-5; European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos
Containing Products, 12 March 2001, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 97-100.
32
For an account suggesting that the American emphasis on domestic stability in the GATT negotiations
was a projection of New Deal policies on domestic regulatory intervention, see Anne-Marie Burley,
“Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory
State,” in John Gerrard Ruggie (ed.) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Insitututional
Form (Columbia Univeristy Press, 1993). For a reflection of this thesis in the GATT treaty text consider
two particular clauses. GATT Article XII authorizes the use of quantitative restrictions to safeguard
domestic balance of payments when payment difficulties had resulted from policies to secure full
employment. GATT Article XIX authorizes emergency action to reintroduce tariff protection where a
domestic producer (and by extension its employees) is threatened with serious injury from import
competition.
33
GATT, supra note 31, Article XX.
34
As stated by the International Court of Justice, “[t]he State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide
whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this
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injured national, custom required the exhaustion of local remedies as a further
prerequisite to the exercise of diplomatic protection. 35 The rationale here was to ensure
that “the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by
its own means, within the framework of its own domestic system” 36. Both of these
customary predicates are eroded in the new dispute settlement processes of BITs, but
only after a slow period of maturation of the investment treaty movement. Early
generation BITs maintained the classic public international law default of state-to-state
mechanisms as the sole means of resolving disputes in this field. 37 The first BIT
(between Italy and Chad) to break from this mould and include a radical new form of
dispute settlement - investor-state arbitration - did not enter force until 1969. 38 And it is
only by 1974 that we can discern a clear trend for the inclusion of investor-state
arbitration in investment treaties. 39

Under these newer structures, foreign investors as private claimants are given standing
to bring action in international fora for breaches of treaty obligations by host signatory
states and there is no requirement for them to first resort to or exhaust domestic legal
processes as a condition of such action. This dramatic elevation of private commercial

respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or
other nature, unrelated to the particular case”. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power
Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, International Court of Justice, p. 44.
35
The exhaustion of local remedies was recognized by the ICJ as “a well-established rule of customary
international law” in the Interhandel Case (Switzerland v United States of America). Interhandel Case
(Switzeland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, International Court of Justice, p. 6.
36
Ibid. p. 7.
37
Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995)
pp. 122-129.
38
Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of
Treatment (Wolters Kluwer 2009) p. 45.
39
Jason Web Yackee, (2008) “Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment and the Rule of Law:
Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?” 42 Law and Society Review p 815.
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interests is finessed through the idea of arbitration “without privity” 40. State signatories
to investment treaties offer their consent, in advance, to the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal to hear disputes between investors and host states. Jurisdiction is ultimately
crystallized when a foreign investor elects to commence a claim for breach against a
signatory state. This structure is a conceptually distinct and far more expansive use of
arbitration than its traditional role of resolving discrete disputes in negotiated contracts
between commercial parties. The standing consent offered in most investment treaties
is usually to a range of systems of dispute settlement at international law. 41 The most
prominent of these is the World Bank-based International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), an arbitral institution that specializes in international
investment disputes. ICSID was formed in 1966, in the eye of the storm of
expropriatory behaviour in the developing world. It offers a self-contained mechanism
to settle disputes between foreign investors and their host states. If a state extends its
consent to ICSID (under a treaty), its right to espouse diplomatic protection is
specifically excluded. 42

The aforementioned body of international investment law, manifested in a dense
network of over 3000 bilateral and regional investment treaties 43, constitutes GIL. By
the 1990s, GIL, empowered by the triumphant zeitgeist of neoliberalism (the “End of
History”), claimed its place as a global model of economic governance. Developing
40

Jan Paulsson, (1995) “Arbitration Without Privity,” 10 ICSID Review, p. 232.
These include UNCITRAL Rules or arbitration under the processes of the International Chamber of
Commerce. Dolzer and Stevens supra note 37 pp. 129-30.
42
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
14 October 1966, 575 UNTS 159, Art. 27.
43
UNCTAD, (2015) “Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS,” 1 IIA Issues Note 2.
41
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countries subscribed to this model in droves as they elected to attract foreign
investment based on free market policies. 44 The number of newly signed BITs as well
as the number of investment disputes subsequently skyrocketed. While there were only
385 BITs signed from 1959 to 1989, a staggering number of 1857 BITs were concluded
from 1990 to 1999. 45 Indeed, as José Alvarez has observed, “[t]he 1990s were the era
when the modern investment regime was born”. 46 Capital-exporting countries, such as
the United States and the European Union, spread their “model” BITs to numerous
capital-importing countries, explaining the isomorphic nature of most BITs signed in that
period. Moreover, some of these model BITs began to be incorporated into investment
chapters of certain regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA, which adopted the
conventional investor-state arbitration mechanism, such as the ICSID rules. In sum, the
dense network of BIT, investment chapters of regional trade agreements and derivative
arbitral jurisprudence from these treaties collectively form GIL.

Figure 1: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Cases (1987-2014)

44

Kenneth Vandevelde, (1998) “Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime,” 19
Michigan Journal of International Law p. 390.
45
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (2000) p. 1.
46
José Alvarez, “The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime,” in M. Arasanjani et al. (eds.),
Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Brill Publishers,
2010) p. 15.

15

(Source: UNCTAD, ISDS Database)47

ASEAN’s Adoption of Global Investment Law

As discussed above, GIL is an economic version of world culture that transnational
actors, both state and non-state, share and advocate as a “policy script.” 48 A dense
transnational network comprised of government officials, private practitioners (that often
have inherent incentives to champion strong investment protections), international
organizations (the IMF and the World Bank), think tanks and academic institutions
“translates” this neoliberal consensus (Washington Consensus) on foreign investment
into the operational language of legislation and enforcement. 49 These “norm
entrepreneurs,” often equipped with expertise and organizational apparatus, play an
47

We imported this figure directly from UNCTAD. UNCTAD 2015, supra note 43.
Sarah Sunn Bush, (2011) “International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures,”
65 International Organizations p. 108.
49
Terence C. Halliday and Pavel Osinsky, (2006) “Globalization of Law,” 32 Annual Review of Sociology
p. 453; John Boli and George Thomas, “INGOs and the Organziation of World Culture,” in John Boli and
George Thomas (eds.) Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since
1875 (Stanford University Press 1999) p. 17.
48
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important role in the norm cycle of GIL as they help GIL spread (cascade) so that they
are eventually internalized into the domestic legal systems of the ASEAN economies. 50
Indeed, ASEAN members’ widespread practices of BITs in the 1980’s and 1990’s with
developed countries appear to have motivated such “norm cascade” through “a
combination of peer pressure for conformity, ASEAN’s own desire to enhance
international legitimation, and state leaders’ aspiration to enhance their self-esteem.”51
In particular, as “enactors” and “carriers” of world investment norms 52, international
organizations, such as IMF, World Bank and APEC, strongly advocated trade and
investment liberalization during the same period. These organizations often “lobby and
harangue states to act on [global investment] principles.” 53 In sum, this norm cycle,
especially the process of norm cascade and internalization, may explain the
isomorphism identifiable in substantive investment norms of ASEAN BITs and the
subsequent AIR. 54

While recognizing possible local deviations, world polity theorists still exhibit a firm belief
on eventual convergence into the global model of economic development. 55 Under
world polity theory, AIR is ASEAN’s voluntary adoption of GIL through its socialization
(learning and emulation) with “rationalized others,” 56 such as developed countries and
international organizations, regarding world investment culture. ASEAN members are

50

Finnemore and Sikkink, supra note 5, p. 895, 898.
Ibid. p. 895.
52
Boli and Thomas, supra note 49, pp. 34, 73.
53
Ibid. p. 46.
54
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55
Meyer et al., supra note 16, p. 146.
56
John Boli and George Thomas, World Polity Formation Since 1875: World Culture and International
Non-Governmental Organizations (1997).
51
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“embedded” in transnational investment networks and therefore socialized to “want”
GIL. 57 (Finnemore 1996:2) World polity theory does not view such adoption forced by a
hegemonic power, as world system theory is inclined to do. World polity theorists would
argue that GIL provided ASEAN economies with a world investment model that is a
highly rationalized (and thus universalized) form of economic governance and that
ASEAN members legitimate themselves in joining this world investment culture. 58 Any
local, particularistic divergence from this world investment model, such as exclusion of
certain sectors from investment liberalization, would in turn suffer a legitimacy deficit. 59

In an apparent penetration of GIL into the ASEAN community, BITs signed by ASEAN
members proliferated in the 1990s, such as Laos (with France in 1989), Vietnam (with
Italy in 1990), Cambodia (with Malaysia in 1994), Brunei (with Germany in 1998) and
Myanmar (with the Philippines in 1998). 60 Those BITs concluded by ASEAN members
in the Nineties demonstrate a high degree of conformity with model BITs promoted by
major capital-exporting countries (such as the U.S) and thus featured common core
elements, such as national treatment, most-favored nation principle, broad protection of
fair and equitable treatment, compensation for direct and indirect expropriation and
investor-state dispute resolution.

57

Finnemore, supra note 11, p. 2.
Meyer et. al., supra note 16, p. 148.
59
Ibid.
60
Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman, and Beth Simmons, (2006) “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,” 60 International Organizations p. 821.
58
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Yet in the heyday of ASEAN BITs (mostly concluded between ASEAN and non-ASEAN
countries), ASEAN members also initiated the formation of a collective “intra-ASEAN
investment regime” (AIR). Those individual BITs, which concerned extra-ASEAN
investment flows, played a decisive role in constructing AIR. Understandably, much of
the treaty language in the AIR can be traced to the BIT movement. The first version of
AIR, the “1987 ASEAN Agreement for Promotion and Protection of Investments,” 61
transplanted many of the major obligations for investor protection found in BITs, such as
adequate compensation for direct or indirect expropriation 62, fair and equitable
treatment 63, the right of foreign investors to repatriate their capital and earnings
(regardless of impact on the financial system of the receiving state)64 and an investorstate arbitration mechanism whose decision is binding as a matter of treaty obligation. 65

The AIR that emerged from the 1987 Agreement subsequently evolved into the “1998
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.” 66 With an ambitious goal of
establishing “a competitive ASEAN Investment Area,”67 the 1998 Framework
Agreement shifted its strategic focus from investor protection that was emphasized in
the 1987 Agreement to “liberalization” of intra-ASEAN investment flow. Now ASEAN
members would seek “a more liberal and transparent investment environment” in order
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to “substantially increase the flow of investments from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN
sources. 68 The level of ambition under the 1998 Framework Agreement was evidenced
by determined commitments, such as national treatment being extended to ASEAN
investors by 2010, and to all investors by 2020; all industries being opened for
investment to ASEAN investors by 2010 and to all investors by 2020. 69

The AIR has culminated in the “2009 Comprehensive Investment Agreement” (ACIA). 70
In this latest iteration, the focus shifted from liberalization to a more expansive objective
of “integration” between the ASEAN states. The ACIA preamble envisions a “more
integrated and interdependent future” 71 with “economic integration to be achieved, inter
alia, through “joint promotion of the region as an integrated investment area”. 72 In the
same line, with special recognition of least developed members, such as Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, “development” took center stage within AIR, leaving its
explicit mark in a set of objectives 73 and guiding principles. 74 The level of ambition
among the member states when it comes to key objectives (such as investment
liberalization) has continued to escalate. Under ACIA, ASEAN members would develop
a “comprehensive investment agreement” that is “comparable to international best
practices”. 75 The aspiration to meet “international best practices” naturally benchmarks
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the long-standing praxis created by the main lawmakers in the field being developed
countries, such as the United States, and international organizations, such as the WTO.

III. The Limit of Global Investment Law’s Homogenizing Effects in ASEAN
Investment Regime

The Limit of Global Investment Law

Despite the AIR’s patterns of convergence into GIL, it appears puzzling that one can still
witness a number of aberrations in the AIR vis-à-vis GIL. While some deviations are not
uncommon in any local implementation of a powerful external benchmark, on close
observation, those in AIR are not so much inconsequential anomalies as structural
heterogeneities that may qualify the general thesis underpinning aspects of world polity
theory. These conspicuous heterogeneities from GIL can be witnessed in both
individual ASEAN BITs and the subsequent collective investment project of the AIR.

Most ASEAN BITs fully preserve the right of the signatory host state to regulate the
question of admission of foreign investment. The myriad of strong BIT protections thus
only apply on a post-establishment basis, being after foreign investment has been
admitted into the host state. At its most extreme, this structure entitles a state to
exclude entire economic sectors from participation by foreign investors which may well
be necessary if those sectors had been targeted as part of an infant industry strategy.
Even if a state chooses to open a given economic sector to foreign competition, they
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are free to impose conditions upon the entry of a foreign investor. In this respect, most
Asian BITs are conceptually different to a stronger liberalization model that
characterizes the investment treaty practice of a number of developed countries,
especially the U.S and Canada. Those states typically require combined national
treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment at the pre-admission stage thus severely
restricting discretionary regulatory mechanisms that prohibit entry or offer it only on
conditions that reduce the overall value of the investment to the investor. 76

Relatedly, many Asian BITs delineate the operation of substantive investment treaty
protections (even on a post-admission basis) by reference to compliance by the foreign
investor with some element of domestic law. At the outset however, it is important to
note that there is heterogeneity on this key point across the entire field of Asian
investment treaty practice. 77 Thailand, for instance, tends to sit at the most
conservative end of a spectrum as evident in Article 3(1) of the 1978 Thailand – UK BIT
provides:
The benefits of this Agreement shall apply only in cases where the investment of
capital by the nationals and companies of one Contracting Party in the territory of
the other Contracting Party has been specifically approved in writing by the
competent authority of the latter Contracting Party. (emphasis added) 78
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This formula requires a foreign investor to prove that they have met very specific and
formalized preconditions to entry, not least approval in writing by the host state. Unless
the foreign investor can do so, their investment will not attract protection under the BIT.
Approval – which will often be tied to registration under domestic law - is often a
technique used by states to supervise the grant of benefits to attract foreign investment
in key economic sectors (including through investment incentives) 79 and to monitor
specific conditions imposed on foreign investors to maximize the development benefits
to the host state from foreign investment in those sectors (through employment of
performance requirements such as local content conditions) 80.

This type of stringent precondition - requiring a discrete and affirmative act on the part
of the host state to guarantee coverage of investment protection - is also a
characteristic of Indonesian and Malaysian BIT practice. For example, Article 9 of the
1970 Belgium-Indonesia BIT provides:
The protections afforded to investors by the provisions of the present Agreement
shall apply:

in Thai BIT practice, see Kingdom of Thailand and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed Jun. 24,
2002, at Art.2(2) .
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Panel, WT/DS54/R, Jul. 2, 1998. See also GATT Panel Report, Canada: Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act, BISD 30S/140, adopted on Feb. 17, 1984 (ruling that the Canadian practice of
enforcing certain undertakings given by foreign investors in order to gain discrete regulatory approval to
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(a) in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia only to investments which have
been approved by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia pursuant to
stipulations contained in the Foreign Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 or other
relevant laws and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia. (emphasis
added) 81

Likewise, under 1981 Malaysia-United Kingdom BIT:

The said term [investment] shall refer…in respects of investments in the territory
of Malaysia, to all investments made in projects classified by the appropriate
Ministry of Malaysia in accordance with its legislation and administrative practice
as an “approved project”. 82

There have been very few disputes initiated under the individual BITs of ASEAN
members where a Tribunal has proceeded to examine the merits of a claim. The
obvious reason for this is, as we have seen, that many of those BITs provide ASEAN
states with the extensive ability to plead non-compliance with domestic law as a basis
for limiting jurisdiction of the BIT.
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The 1987 Agreement, which was the first version of AIR, continued this inward-looking,
sovereigntist trend, despite its goal of facilitating greater investment flows within the
ASEAN community. Most of all, the 1987 Agreement effectively restricted treaty
protection for foreign investors by subjecting those protected investment to formal
government approval with possible conditions imposed by the host government. 83
Concomitantly, this strict threshold for investor protection prevented foreign investors
from seeking remedies from the investor-state arbitration mechanism under the 1987
Agreement. In Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v Myanmar, the Tribunal refused to hear
the investor's claim on the grounds that the investor failed to prove that the investment
in question had been formally approved when the 1987 Agreement took effect. 84 Other
arbitral tribunals outside of the ASEAN context have criticized such formalities as they
“advance no real interest of either signatory State” and “constitute an artificial trap
depriving investors of the very protection the BIT was intended to provide”. 85 Indeed,
the Yaung Chi Oo Tribunal itself admitted that “[t]he 1987 Agreement was thus subject
to important limitations in terms of its coverage, as compared with other bilateral and
multilateral investment protection treaties”. 86

The more advanced 1998 Framework Agreement also revealed a seriously limited
dimension when compared to the typical orientation in GIL, despite its expansive
mandate to “substantially increase the flow of investments into ASEAN from both
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ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources. 87 In contrast to the detailed roadmap on
liberalization of restrictions on flows of foreign investment (at least within ASEAN), the
1998 Framework Agreement makes no direct reference to the usual investment
protection mechanisms found in most BITs such as guarantees of fair and equitable
treatment, full protection and security and compensation in the event of direct or indirect
expropriation. On first view, this would seem to raise the paradoxical possibility that the
ASEAN members are providing lower standards of investment protection amongst
themselves compared to what is offered (via BITs) to foreign investors from non-ASEAN
states. Yet on closer examination, the framers seem to have adopted a scaffolding
strategy that would see the new liberalization guarantees (in the 1998 Framework
Agreement) apply concurrently with the largely protective standards (in the 1987
ASEAN Agreement):

Member States affirm their existing rights and obligations under the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and its 1996
Protocol. In the event that this Agreement provides for better or enhanced
provisions over the said Agreement and its Protocol, then such provisions of this
Agreement shall prevail. 88

There are a number of problems with this general strategy as well as with the particular
framing of this clause. The strategy is certainly an opportunity lost for the ASEAN
members. Many of the unqualified standards (in the 1987 ASEAN Agreement) reflect
87
88
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the high-water mark of investment protection as articulated in BITs (and thus GIL)
entered into throughout the 1980s. By the mid to late 1990s (especially within the
NAFTA), a number of states had begun to more carefully calibrate those standards in
an attempt to better balance investment protection with core components of regulatory
autonomy. Of course, the new 1998 Framework Agreement contains a range of very
extensive exceptions that, it could be argued, are designed to supply precisely such a
recalibrated balance among the ASEAN members. Yet one can easily imagine a
scenario whereby there is legal lacuna in how the two instruments relate to each other.
For instance, the 1987 ASEAN Agreement provides for a largely unqualified obligation
among member states to allow for free transfer of capital 89 and also provides for
investor-state dispute resolution. 90 Yet the 1998 Framework Agreement inserts a range
of exceptions that would enable an ASEAN member to impose capital restrictions. In a
hypothetical dispute surrounding the imposition of capital controls, the question arises
whether the ASEAN member can invoke the later exceptions to justify any prima facie
breach of the earlier obligations. The framing of the loose conflict component (in the
formula above) seems to suggest that the provisions of the 1998 Framework Agreement
will prevail if they provide for “better or enhanced provisions”. Yet, this only begs the
question of what evaluative criteria should be employed to identify whether the later
1998 Framework Agreement meets this standard. From a strict investor protection
viewpoint, the earlier 1987 Instrument obviously provides a higher (and thus presumably
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“better”) standard. 91 But one might also argue that the increased detail of the
Agreement (especially on exceptions) necessarily constitute “enhanced provisions” (and
relatedly, to the extent they represent the new sovereign choice among ASEAN
member states to recalibrate investment treaty exposure, also represent a “better”
standard).

Moreover, the dispute settlement provisions of the 1998 Framework Agreement are
marked by a further pull back from earlier investment protection standards. Specifically,
the ASEAN members have confined dispute settlement to state-to-state procedures
revoking entirely the standing of foreign investors as private claimants to initiate
investor-state arbitration (which continues to operate only under the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement). The wisdom of this choice is open to question. The new treaty is
characterized by both limited scope of operation (in that it only extends to FDI) and a
broad range of flexibilities (in the form of exemptions from investment treaty strictures
for compelling state purposes). With this in mind, the likely concerns of unmeritorious
instigation of investor-state arbitration as well as the possibility of expansive proinvestor readings seem to be countered (at least partly) by these treaty innovations.
The costs of omission of investor-state arbitration too are very real and significant.
Affected foreign investors from a given ASEAN state are now left to the mercy of the
discretion of their home governments to espouse their claim in the state-to-state forum.
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This significant gap in legal protection is vividly illustrated by the Yaung Chi Oo dispute
where the Singaporean investor in Myanmar was denied protection under the 1987
ASEAN Agreement (for failure to show that Myanmar had “specifically approved” its
investment for the purposes of that treaty) and although falling within the scope of the
later 1998 Framework Agreement, had no standing to commence a claim under that
treaty. In cases such as this – where the amount of invested capital is relatively small
and the economic actor does not have political traction within the home state - the
prospect of espousal under state-state dispute settlement process is remote at best.
This weak intra-ASEAN investor protection is increasingly costly to ASEAN members
and tends to necessarily impede further economic integration. In particular, considering
the more liberal extra-ASEAN investment treaties, this asymmetry deters ASEAN
members from fully taking advantage of synergies between intra- and extra- ASEAN
investment treaties, tracking the inherent limitations of the “hub and spoke” model in
regional trade agreements. 92

Interestingly, the ACIA, as the most recent version of AIR, also exhibits asymmetry
between intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investment treatment, yet in a diametrically
opposite fashion. Now the ambitious liberalization package would apply only to intraASEAN investment, abandoning a dual goal of facilitating both intra-ASEAN and extraASEAN investment flows under the 1998 Framework Agreement. Even the effective
scope of intra-ASEAN investment has diminished in comparison with the 1998
92
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Framework Agreement. While the 1998 Framework Agreement required ASEAN
members to “open immediately all its industries for investments by ASEAN investors,”93
ACIA only provides a positive list of liberalized areas, such as manufacturing,
agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying and services incidental to
manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying. 94

The AIR’s approach to the investor-state arbitration mechanism demonstrates a salient
departure from GIL, including the NAFTA Chapter 11 and its arbitral jurisprudence. The
arbitral jurisprudence – especially in cases brought against ASEAN member states - is
not the only external influence that has shaped the contours of the ACIA. The
expressed desire to develop an investment initiative “comparable to international best
practices” has also led the ASEAN negotiators to draw on a range of external treaty
practice. While NAFTA Chapter 11 is an obvious comparator, 95 the ASEAN negotiators
have also draw on subsequent changes to the investment treaty practices of the U.S
and Canada made in light of their experiences as respondents to cases brought under
NAFTA Chapter 11. Yet the modeling from that experience is by no means one of
simple and crude transplant, as is occasionally evident in the practice of some states in
the international community. The evidence shows that the negotiators have been
reasonably careful in sifting through those lessons and adapting them to the specific
context of the ASEAN grouping.
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For instance, NAFTA Chapter 11 excludes subsidies and government procurement from
the obligation to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investment vis-à-vis
domestic counterparts. 96 The ACIA does the same but goes one step further. It
excludes subsidies and grants from all of the disciplines of the treaty. 97 This seemingly
small distinction is especially significant in the ASEAN context. Under NAFTA Chapter
11, subsidies could still be subject to investor-state complaint as breaching the separate
obligation of fair and equitable treatment and that discipline, for a select group of arbitral
tribunals, has been understood to include a particular constraint against
discrimination. 98 Certain forms of subsidies are, by definition, discriminatory in that they
are only extended to domestic actors and if that reading of fair and equitable treatment
were to be applied by a hypothetical tribunal, it would preclude their use entirely in key
settings. That litigation risk is however foreclosed in the ASEAN context, which is
particularly important given the complex economic and political issues associated with
the use of subsidies. Alan Sykes, for instance, has cast doubt from an economic
perspective on whether many legal systems (including but not limited to the WTO) can
differentiate socially constructive subsidies from those that are economically
problematic. 99

There is also evidence of a clear feedback loop between key investor-state arbitral
cases and particular negotiation choices made in the ACIA. When it comes to the
96

Ibid. Art. 1108(7).
ACIA, supra note 70, art. 3(4)(b).
98
The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v U.S.A, Award (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
June 26, 2003), para. 135-6.
99
Alan O. Sykes (2010), “The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective,
2(2) Journal of Legal Analysis, p. 473.
97

31

obligation to accord most-favoured-nation treatment, a distinct set of arbitral tribunals
have ruled that that obligation can be used by a foreign claimant to import dispute
settlement mechanisms from another treaty entered into by the respondent host state.
In that way, claimants have been able to avoid preconditions to the commencement of
investor-state arbitration in the primary treaty such as a mandatory period of litigation in
the domestic courts of the host state. In the first ruling of this jurisprudential line, the
Maffezini v Spain Tribunal relied on a comparative methodology (drawing on different
formulations within the universe of BITs) to justify its broad interpretation of the MFN
obligation, pointing out that where states parties have decided to confine the obligation
to substantive rather than procedural differences they have done so explicitly in a given
clause. 100 The ACIA negotiators in turn have provided future tribunals with precisely
that sort of explicit direction in footnote 4 which provides that “[f]or greater
certainty…this Article shall not apply to investor-State dispute settlement procedures
that are available in other agreements to which Member States are party”. 101

The 2009 ACIA also now includes obligations of fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security which had been omitted in the 1998 Framework Agreement. 102
The fair and equitable standard has been a primary driver of state dissatisfaction with
the expanding investor-state arbitral jurisprudence, as it has been applied broadly with
tribunals often adopting strained interpretative methodologies. Here there is a
100
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qualitative break with the preferred strategies of key NAFTA members in responding to
the growing arbitral jurisprudence on fair and equitable treatment. The U.S., for
instance, has elected to constrain the zone of discretion of arbitral adjudicators by
explicitly linking fair and equitable treatment obligation to the minimum standard of
protection for aliens under customary international law. 103 Yet if the goal of this treaty
recalibration is not only to confine protection but to deliver certainty in adjudication, then
there are questions as to the wisdom of this method given the notorious difficulty of
locating customary international law such as the requirement of opinio juris. The
ASEAN framers instead have elected to restrict the fair and equitable standard to the
one clear aspect that is commonly accepted as part of the customary standard being
the obligation not to deny justice to foreigners in legal and administrative
proceedings. 104

Contextualizing Global Investment Law within ASEAN

While world polity theory is useful in explaining AIR’s general patterns of institutional
development especially its isomorphic relationship with GIL, world polity theory still
cannot fully grasp AIR’s unique historical specificity characterized by “legacies of
founding moments in shaping long-term power relations” and the “prevalence of
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incremental reform over stasis and fundamental transformations.”105 Indeed, those
general patterns (such as the expansion of investment liberalization) are often
interrupted by unpredictable, and even inefficient, developments. 106

Admittedly, even world polity theorists do not envision perfect adoption by states of
world culture. They are prepared to concede particular incoherence between dominant
world culture and local variations (“decoupling”). Indeed, any wholesale importation of
world culture into diverse local conditions appears infeasible 107, especially as the highly
idealized nature of world culture would inevitably conflict with various local contexts. 108
To that extent, they appear to acknowledge that isomorphism does not necessarily
mean “equifinality.” 109 Nonetheless, from a highly rationalist (functionalist) perspective,
world polity theorists tend to equate local variations with local resistance to world culture.
They believe that states, “as a matter of identity,” have already committed themselves to
“such self-evident goals as socioeconomic development.” 110

AIR members certainly obtain their collective identities from GIL as GIL constitutes
those members’ actions (policies) regarding international investment liberalization and
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regulation. 111 In a Durkheimian sense, those actions collectively “represent” GIL. At the
same time, however, social actors do not mechanically follow global scripts: they may
“select” from, and even “modify,” them. 112 Thus, their identities are also constituted by
domestic values, such as in the claim to particularity inherent in the vaunted “ASEAN
Way”. 113 As Laurence Whitehead observes, “national historical memories may filter the
interpretation of transmissions from abroad.”114 Likewise, Daniel Lynch contends that
“states differ dramatically on the question of whether to submit to complete
reconstitution by yielding to global socialization and allowing international symbol
markets to shape domestic collective identity.” 115 In this setting, the level of AIR
members’ socialization with contemporary peers, or the titular “rationalized others,”
cannot but be limited. In particular, to tackle unique local, not global, problems,
“different and shifting” solutions will be tried. 116

Against this background, historical institutionalism can brighten analytical blind spots left
by world polity theory. Historical institutionalists capture subtlety and complexity in
historical development of international organizations under the notion of “path
dependency.” According to Fiortetos, path dependency is “a process in which the
structure that prevails after a specific moment in time (often a critical juncture) shapes
the subsequent trajectory in ways that make alternative institutional designs
substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would be more efficient
111
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according to a standard expected utility model.” 117 Likewise, Pierson and Skocpol
define path dependency as a situational context in which “outcomes at a critical juncture
trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into
the future.” 118 The concept of path dependency is instrumental in deciphering
sociocultural codes shared by ASEAN members that tenaciously affect AIR’s
institutional development despite a strong pro-market headwind from GIL. 119 As Ronald
Robertson trenchantly observes, economic internationalization does not lead to the
demise of “nationally constituted society.” 120

Importantly, initial historical conditions do not per se determine outcomes: they are
rather “stochastically” related. 121 That set of initial conditions generates “its own law of
inertia” that will decrease the compliance cost yet dramatically increase the cost of
departure therefrom. 122 Economists often refer this phenomenon as “increasing
returns.” 123 Such notion of increasing returns (and therefore path dependency) tends to
gain unique persuasive traction given various characteristics of political life, such as its
collective, intersubjective nature, the lack of exit options, its self-reinforcing nature, and
the prevalence of interpretive heuristics. 124

117

Fioretos, supra note 105, p. 376.
Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in Ira
Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (W.W. Norton &
Company, 2002) p. 699.
119
Ronald Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (SAGE Publications, 1992) p. 4.
120
Ibid. p. 5.
121
Jack Goldstone, (1998) “Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence and Explanation in
Historical Sociology,” 104 American Journal of Sociology p. 834.
122
Ma, supra note 23, p. 64.
123
Robrt Rycroft and Don Kash, The Complexity Challenge: Technological Innovation for the 21st
Century, (Thomson Learning, 1999) p. 263.
124
Pierson, supra note 106, pp. 257-262; Ma, supra note 23, p. 65.
118

36

Historical institutionalism may offer the following explanation regarding the tenacious
legacy effects of sovereigntism even in AIR’s most recent development stage (ACIA).
The strong inward-looking cultural norm, as represented by the “ASEAN Way,” shaped
the founding moments of ASEAN. The “ASEAN Way” can be defined as “traditions of
consultation and consensus-building and, in particular, the norm of non-interference in
each other’s internal affairs” 125 or a “meta-regime of non-interference, sovereignty,
incrementalism, informality and consensual decision-making.” 126 This grand principle
that became the bedrock of ASEAN originated from the resolution of a fierce regional
conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia over disputed territory in Borneo from 1963 to
1966, which is coined Konfrontasi. 127 ASEAN countries had to suspend regional
confrontation among one another to collectively respond to radical communism home
and abroad and focus on economic development. 128 The ASEAN Way is often
expounded as a reason for the lack of any major military conflicts since ASEAN’s
inception as a regional organization. 129
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Yet political non-interference can easily translate into “protectionism” in an economic
sense. 130 Once such an overarching norm is firmly established, power elites (politicians
and bureaucrats) and domestic interest groups (including domestic producers of main
products) in ASEAN economies configured their strategic position on the basis of this
inward-looking orientation. Such initial position also generates increasing returns, or
positive externalities, through coordination and networking for those particular
groups. 131 As long as these vested interests benefit from the initial arrangement, those
beneficiaries have no reason to change the status quo. Admittedly, protectionism is
ubiquitous yet in general destined to be defeated by increasing market openness in
most economies. Nonetheless, ASEAN’s unique path dependency defined by colonial
experience and intra-ASEAN power struggle placed their priority products (such as
agro-based and wood-based products) in a strategically important position. Thus,
ASEAN economies remain “intransigently protectionist” despite potential benefits from
an integrated internal market and economies of scale therefrom. 132 This path
dependency may explain a puzzling asymmetry between intra-ASEAN trade flows and
extra-ASEAN flows regarding those priority products. 133 In these two product sectors,
most of the intra-ASEAN trade share is comprised of intra-ASEAN imports, which
demonstrates a strong extra-ASEAN export bias in such sectors. 134 In other words,
ASEAN members producing those products elected to target global markets instead of
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ASEAN markets in the face of strong protectionism at the regional level. Likewise, a
certain critical juncture, such as the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, may have led ASEAN
members to further entrench the early sovereigntist culture (such as the ASEAN Way),
while other non-ASEAN countries may have embraced the same event as an
opportunity for transformation. 135

TABLE 1: Total imports, exports, and intra-ASEAN exports, by priority sectors,
2004-08 136(WITS)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Thousand
Intra-ASEAN
exports
Agro-based
1,360,040
933,008
1,144,436
1,687,945
2,788,211
products
Automotives
3,283,824
4,191,755
4,690,222
6,416,477
7,987,317
Electronics
47,876,167 52,268,178 56,110,336 57,982,542 56,928,581
Healthcare
869,375
987,092
1,235,436
1,685,250
2,000,350
Textiles and apparel
1,932,309
1,912,064
2,122,545
2,420,349
2,431,291
Wood-based
1,143,053
1,230,734
1,237,746
1,394,430
1,424,370
products
ASEAN exports to
rest of world
Agro-based products 12,103,978 12,486,983 14,057,296 19,313,273 28,435,800
Automotives
11,893,715 15,714,044 18,579,336 25,174,340 27,124,044
Electronics
215,482,996 239,608,257 265,615,439 266,126,413 267,278,788
Healthcare
3,506,738 5,692,372 8,071,235 10,049,727 10,167,219
Textiles and apparel
28,252,081 29,279,163 33,140,705 36,301,953 38,527,881
Wood-based
14,874,195 16,074,553 17,000,980 18,327,184 17,661,561
products
ASEAN imports
from rest of world
Agro-based products
2,858,852 3,280,498 3,798,554 5,090,003 6,695,704
135
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Automotives
20,993,758 22,482,370 21,549,767 26,486,024 33,332,207
Electronics
112,712,493 115,987,928 135,143,296 140,732,507 146,680,531
Healthcare
5,299,171 6,456,913 7,290,542 8,359,650 9,339,715
Textiles and apparel
13,597,104 14,690,394 16,692,532 21,385,662 22,541,775
Wood-based
865,724
989,336 1,255,923 1,615,914 1,543,718
products

Furthermore, AIR’s institutional transformations appear more sporadic than linear, as
world polity or rational choice theorists may envision. Such non-linearity in institutional
evolution may be accounted for by a phenomenon coined “institutional layering.” 137 The
framers of ASEAN (and AIR) as sovereigntists were largely reluctant to transfer their
regulatory power over investment to AIR. Instead, they preferred adding new regulatory
layers to existing institutional arrangements (treaties). Thus, one can witness
incremental institutional arrangements in regulating foreign investment, rather than a
full-blown liberalization through ceding regulatory power to AIR.

ASEAN’s sovereigntist path has led AIR to deviate from “historical efficiency” 138 (fullblown investment liberalization) that might have resulted from GIL as part of world
culture. Given that divergence from world investment culture, AIR can be said to
demonstrate “decentering” that protects core local values from GIL’s homogenizing
power. 139 In the same vein, the closer, and therefore the more directly, GIL affects core
local culture, such as sovereignty, the more likely GIL engenders resistance from the
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receiving entity (AIR). 140 Perhaps, the very content of GIL is incoherent and contingent,
considering fierce competition among powerful actors who desire to advance their own
standards as GIL. 141 Such “dialectical and internally contradictory character” 142 of GIL
may provide AIR members with ample justifications for their occasional departure from
core values of GIL.

IV. Conclusion

This article has probed the unique ontogenetical path of AIR from two opposing
perspectives. First, reflecting world polity theory, AIR has demonstrably emulated GIL
ever since ASEAN members fully subscribed to neoliberal reform, such as investment
liberalization, in the 1980s. Saddled with the overpowering trends of globalization,
ASEAN members made an ambitious paradigm shift toward free and open investment
in their development strategy. At the same time, however, a number of non-trivial
exemptions from GIL that AIR saliently exhibits raise into question any unreserved
transplant of this world investment culture. Here, ASEAN members’ socio-cultural
background, epitomized by the “ASEAN Way,” tends to expound these selective
divergences. Historical institutionalism illustrates such distinct path-dependency under
AIR.
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To overcome an ostensibly irreconcilable dyad between tenacious oracles of pro-market
economic governance from GIL and AIR’s apparent departure therefrom, one should
embrace the fact that the “globality” itself transcends the global economy, although the
former may still include the latter. 143 Applied to the specific context of ASEAN, rather
than viewing AIR as a mere outlier from a conventional normative model, scholars of
international law and politics should acknowledge the necessity of defining a new form
of GIL that is more inclusive and flexible than the conventional paradigm. Reimagining
GIL in this edifying manner holds open the promise of offering policymakers and
negotiators with innovative conceptual tools with which to reconstruct a more effective
and legitimate set of international norms for investment liberalization and protection.
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